United States of Sub-Saharan Africa (USSA) would prevent Chinese hegemony
Debt traps, control of infrastructures including 78 ports, appropriation of rare and agricultural land, militarization, etc., sub-Saharan Africa could see the future of its populations mortgaged by China for several decades. However, the creation of a United States of Sub-Saharan Africa could help prevent Chinese hegemony. A concrete and ambitious industrialization program would preserve the interests and sovereignty of the people. This model could eventually generate some of the 20 million jobs the sub-Saharan region will need every year. This less informal economy would generate new tax revenues for governments, which could then finance infrastructure, public services and their modernization.
1) The debt trap is gradually closing in on sub-Saharan Africa
The IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative wiped out the debt of the 40 sub-Saharan African countries concerned. China, which held just 3% of sub-Saharan Africa's bilateral debt, stepped into the breach.
With 62.1% in 2020 and more today, China is now the region's leading creditor. Although China is well aware that its financial commitments will not be honored in the long term if sub-Saharan countries do not develop significantly, it is nevertheless multiplying its public-private partnerships (PPPs), loans and other contractual agreements.
A BBC article reported in September 2024: "China's lending to and investment in African countries has slowed recently. This is because many African states have had difficulty repaying loans for infrastructure built by China in their countries. Today, many African countries have found that these projects are not bringing in enough revenue to repay the loans". By elsewhere, China is no longer content to offer African countries major infrastructure projects such as roads, railroads and ports, but is supplying them with high-tech products such as 4G and 5G telecoms networks, space satellites, solar panels and electric vehicles (EVs). "China has been accused of selling electric vehicles on the African market at low prices," "This is a way for China to export its new cutting-edge green technologies."
"China calls its investments in Africa win-win, but China's construction projects in Africa have brought very few benefits to the local population," says Professor Tsang, "and this has led to resentment. Chinese companies mainly bring in their own workers, and don't offer many local jobs". There is also a perception that they employ local workers in harsh working conditions.
At the close of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing in September 2024, the IRIS Institute denounced an asymmetrical partnership: "Beijing has pledged $50 billion over the next three years, including $29 billion in loans, $11 billion in aid and $10 billion in investments, but these figures must be analyzed with great caution. New investment projects involve solar energy (solar panels, batteries), giving priority to the energy transition and greater autonomy for the continent. But these projects, which may be considered unbalanced in terms of impact because the products are manufactured in China, will not help to reduce Africa's trade deficit, nor will they lead to transfers of technology or skills. Some African leaders, such as South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, have called for a change in trade patterns, calling for job-creating investment. China sees Africa as a major source of minerals, fuels and agricultural products, as well as an outlet for its low-cost processed products. Land acquisition is one of Beijing's objectives, although some would say it's a land grab.
According to the Ecofin agency, China-Africa trade grew by 4.8% in 2024, to $295 billion". China has increased its supplies of agricultural products, such as avocados, soybeans, pineapples, chillies, cashew nuts, sesame seeds and spices, to Africa, but Chinese exports to Africa are mainly composed of finished goods (textiles-clothing, machinery, electronics, etc..), while African imports to the Middle Kingdom are dominated by raw materials such as crude oil, copper, cobalt and iron ore, resulting in a chronic trade surplus in China's favor".
Unsustainable debt servicing, often higher than health care and education combined
In the June 5, 2025 issue of Le Monde, the South African government estimated that more than half of the 1.3 billion people living in Africa are in countries that spend more money on debt interest payments than on social issues such as health, education and infrastructure. This year, African countries are expected to pay nearly $89 billion (around 78 billion euros) in debt servicing, while 20 low-income countries are in debt distress. Added to this is the cessation of U.S. humanitarian aid, and the pressure on North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries to spend more on defense, tempting them to cut their aid budgets. "The impact on the African continent is going to be very severe," predicts Trevor Manuel.
According to Africa's Pulse spring 2025: improving governance and delivering for people in Africa, published on April 23, 2025 by the World Bank, sub-Saharan Africa will pay $20 billion in interest on its outstanding foreign debt this year. The changing composition of external creditors has led to an increase in both interest payments and principal repayments.
In the article "L'Afrique subsaharienne paiera 20 milliards $ d'intérêts sur l'encours de sa dette extérieure en 2025", Agence Ecofin comments: Nearly 75% of the interest payments on outstanding external debt expected this year are due to bondholders, the Chinese government and private lenders. Overall, interest payments are expected to represent 3.4% of the region's cumulative GDP on average over the period 2025-2027. Total public debt servicing (domestic and external) more than doubled before the pandemic (from 16% of public revenues in 2012 to 39% in 2019) and appears to have stabilized at a record level of around 50% of public revenues in 2024.
The public debt/GDP ratio reached 63.2% at the end of 2024.
The increase in public and state-guaranteed external debt servicing is attributed to an expanding creditor environment that includes non-Paris Club governments and private creditors, particularly bondholders. African governments borrow at significantly different rates from these different creditor groups. For example, the average interest rate on foreign sovereign bonds is around six times higher than that on multilateral loans. As a result, governments are forced to divert funds from essential public services. Out of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 20 spent more on debt servicing than on healthcare and education combined, concludes Agence Ecofin.
China is wary of encouraging African industrialization that would jeopardize imports of its products. It is likely that China is counting on many countries defaulting on their debts, which will enable it in return to lay its hands on sub-Saharan wealth and certain infrastructures, for which it will then be free to set the price of use, including that of energy.
2) China already controls 78 African ports, but what are its military objectives?
Selon l’Agence de presse italienne AGI, sur 231 ports commerciaux opérationnels dans le continent, les entreprises chinoises sont des actionnaires actifs dans 78 ports dans 32 pays, avec une prédilection pour la région occidentale. Une présence qui assure à Pékin un contrôle stratégique des accès et favorise ses objectifs militaires.
With a total of 231 commercial ports in Africa, Chinese companies are present in over a quarter of the continent's maritime hubs, being active shareholders in 78 ports in 32 countries. This is underlined by the latest study from the Center for Strategic Studies on Africa, an institute affiliated to the US Department of Defense, specializing in security and geopolitical research. According to the research, Chinese state-owned enterprises are either builders, financiers or direct operators of some 78 ports on the continent, with a predilection for West African terminals (35 ports), followed by those on the eastern (17), southern (15) and northern (11) coasts. This is a far more widespread presence than in other regions: by way of comparison, Asia is home to 24 ports built or managed by China, and Latin America and the Caribbean to around ten.
In some African ports, Chinese companies dominate the entire port development process, from financing and construction to operation and ownership. Large conglomerates such as the China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC) have been entrusted with works as main contractors, then their management to subcontracting subsidiaries such as the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC): This is the case of the Nigerian port of Lekki, one of the busiest in West Africa, where CHEC carried out the design and construction work after obtaining a loan from the China Development Bank (CDB), ultimately acquiring a 54% financial stake in the port, which it manages with a 16-year lease. In addition to the port of Lekki, in West Africa, Chinese companies hold over 50% of the terminal in Kribi, Cameroon (exactly 66%) and Lomé, Togo (50%).
China's capillary presence in African ports is part of Beijing's wider development of global connectivity along six corridors, as many routes and various ports and countries around the world: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a project of prime importance for China, and an opportunity hard to ignore for Africa. Indeed, three of the six corridors in the Chinese plan cross the continent, arriving in East Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), the Egyptian Suez region and Tunisia. A factor that confirms, once again, the central role played by the African continent in Beijing's global ambitions. Furthermore, BIS's five-year plan (2021-2025) emphasizes the desire to transform China into "a strong maritime country", as part of a broader renewal as a "great power" with "strategic forces abroad". In developing the New Silk Road, Beijing also plans to link new trade corridors and 16 landlocked African countries to ports, as part of a strategy to open up new markets.
The study also looks at the implications in terms of territorial power of managing operating leases or port concessions to China. Through its companies, Beijing holds operating concessions in 10 African ports, ensuring strategic control of access. In addition to the financial benefits of maritime activities, the port operator determines the allocation of quays, accepts or rejects calls and can offer preferential rates and services to ships and goods from its country. Control of port operations by an outside player therefore raises concerns in terms of sovereignty and security, which is why some countries have banned management by foreign port operators. However, despite the risks of loss of control, the trend in Africa is to privatize port operations to improve efficiency. The risks associated with outsourcing port management also include the logistical support of military activities. The port of Doraleh in Djibouti, for example, promoted for years by Beijing for purely commercial purposes, was expanded to accommodate a naval facility in 2017. Since that year, the small country in the Horn of Africa has been home to China's first overseas military base, with a model that some believe could be replicated elsewhere on the continent.
The growing presence of Chinese companies in African ports also inevitably furthers Beijing's military objectives. In 36 of the 78 port locations in which Chinese companies are involved - over 46% of the total - People's Liberation Army navy ships can dock. These include the ports of Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), Port-Gentil (Gabon), Casablanca (Morocco), Tamatave (Madagascar), Maputo (Mozambique), Tincan (Nigeria), Pointe-Noire (Republic of Congo), Victoria (Seychelles), Durban and Simon's Town (South Africa). Some of these ports have also opened bases for People's Liberation Army military exercises over the years. These include the ports of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Lagos (Nigeria), Durban (South Africa) and Doraleh (Djibouti). The latter involved exercises with Ethiopia, a country that has been landlocked since Eritrea gained independence (1993), and which is waging an aggressive political campaign to reclaim it.
Chinese troops have also used naval and land facilities for some of their exercises, including the Kigamboni naval base in Tanzania, the Mapinga comprehensive military training center and the Ngerengere air base, all built by Chinese companies. The Awash Arba technical warfare school had a similar purpose in Ethiopia, as did bases in other countries. In all, according to the American Center for Studies, from 2000 to the present day, the People's Liberation Army has made 55 port calls and 19 bilateral and multilateral military exercises in Africa. In addition to direct military engagements, this presence is also expressed in the management of military logistics.
Everyone will understand that China has every intention of cutting sub-Saharan Africa to the bone, but it's not yet too late for its peoples to react and embrace a development model that will benefit all Africans.
Read also: The increasing militarization of Chinese policy in Africa by Paul Nantulya
Francis Journot is a consultant, entrepreneur, and economic researcher. He is the founder of the United States of Sub-Saharan Africa (USSA) project and the Program for the Industrialization of Sub-Saharan Africa, also known as Africa Atlantic Axis. He is also the initiator of the International Convention for a Global Minimum Wage.